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The last time an article was dedicated to the Nirukta passage referring to 
Audumbaråyaˆa's views on speech (1.1-2) is more than 30 years ago. Since then, if I 
am not mistaken, only one footnote (Biardeau, 1964: 413-14 n. 3) and part of a 
discussion addressing a different question (Aklujkar, 1978: 149-151) have touched 
upon it. This relative lack of interest is not explained by a presumed solution of all the 
problems this passage contains. Quite on the contrary, the author of the most recent 
article dedicated to this passage, Nils Simonsson (1961: 22), states right at the 
beginning that it would certainly be futile to consider or to try to persuade others that 
the interpretation to be presented in his paper is the final one. Madeleine Biardeau 
(1964: 414 n. 3), similarly, characterizes her interpretation as "forcément conjecturale". 
And indeed, one may doubt whether a final interpretation of this passage will ever be 
reached. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to think that all possibilities have been 
fully explored. The present note is meant to be a modest contribution to the discussion, 
by drawing attention to some hitherto insufficiently studied points. 
 To begin with the passage as it appears at the beginning of Simonsson's article: 
(1) indriyanityaµ vacanam audumbaråyaˆa˙. 
(2) tatra catu∑†vaµ nopapadyate ‘yugapadutpannånåµ vå ßabdånåm 
itaretaropadeßa˙ ßåstrak®to yogaß ca. 
(3) vyåptimattvåt tu ßabdasyåˆ¥yastvåc ca ßabdena saµjñåkaraˆaµ vyavahårårthaµ 
loke. 
(4) te∑åµ manu∑yavad devatåbhidhånam. 
(5) puru∑avidyånityatvåt karmasampattir mantro vede. 
 The first point to be noted is that this passage appears to refer to an opposition 
between physical sound and non-physical forms of language. The word ßabda would 
then refer to physical sound, which is described as ayugapadutpanna "not produced 
simultaneously". It seems probable that individual [198] speech sounds (phonemes) are 
meant,1 but for the argument it does not matter if ßabda is believed to refer to whole 
words, or even to complete sentences, as long as the physical manifestations of these 
                                                
* I thank Eivind Kahrs and Jan Houben for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 Compare the similar concern in Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 1.4.109 vt. 10 (ed. Kielhorn, vol. I, p. 356, l. 5 f.): in 
the word gau˙ the sounds au and ˙ are not there while g is being pronounced, and the same is true of the other 
sounds; sounds disappear as soon as they have arisen (uccaritapradhvaµsina˙ khalv api varˆå˙); no single sound is 
the companion of another sound (na varˆo varˆasya sahåya˙). 
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entities are meant. These physical sounds are contrasted with non-physical linguistic 
entities, which are described as vacana (1), and perhaps also by the word saµjñå (3).2 
 The problems discussed in this passage seem to be connected with a view of 
language as essentially consisting of physical sound. These problems are: 
(i) How can words, if they consist of (or are) entities which do not even exist 
simultaneously, be divided into four categories? How can they refer to each other? How 
can grammar connect them? 
(ii) Why were these fleeting entities used in the first place in the process of naming? 
(iii) How can Vedic mantras have any effect if they are nothing but unstable and 
fleeting sounds? 
 Problem (ii) needs some comments. The compound saµjñåkaraˆa (3) — and 
this is the second point to which I wish to draw attention in this paper — may refer to 
more than just ordinary naming. We find a similar expression in Vaiße∑ika SËtra (ed. 
Jambuvijaya) 2.1.18: saµjñåkarma tv asmadvißi∑†ånåµ li∫gam "The activity of naming 
allows us to infer the existence of beings superior to us". The reference is here to the 
process of naming by superior beings, no doubt Ù∑is, at the beginning of time, when 
language was introduced. There is no need to recall here that many early civilisations 
consider naming to be the primary function of language (Staal, 1979: 4 f.). We find this 
idea in India already in the Ùgveda.3 The problem [199] addressed in the Nirukta might 
very well be: why did the ancient Ù∑is use in this connection the medium of sound, 
which disappears as soon as it is produced, and not any other, more durable, medium? 
The answer is given in (3): because sound is pervasive and utterly small. In other 
words, the use of the medium of sound has, besides some undeniable drawbacks, some 
equally undeniable advantages, which few other mediums will be able to match.4 
 Problems (i) and (iii) demand as answer that speech does not only exist in the 
form of fleeting sounds. This answer — or rather, two of them — is indeed found in the 
passage: speech is constantly present (nitya) in the indriya (1); and the Vedic mantra is 
constantly present in human knowledge (puru∑avidyånitya) (5). Understood in this way, 
the word nitya in (1) and (5) expresses the opposite of momentariness: it is true that 
physical sound is momentary, but speech has another form which is nitya, which 
survives at least long enough for a classification of words to make sense, etc.5 Which is 
                                                
2 Similarly Biardeau, 1964: 414 n. 3. 
3 See, e.g., RV 10.71.1, in the translation of Louis Renou (1956: 71): "O B®haspati, ce fut là le premier 
commencement de la Parole, quand ils (i.e. the first poet-seers, referred to by the word dh¥ra in the next stanza; J.B.) 
se mirent en branle, donnant une dénomination (nåmadhéyaµ dádhånå˙) (aux choses)." 
4 It is difficult to be sure whether Yåska actually thought of other mediums that might have been used by the Ù∑is. 
Falk (1993: 241 f.) argues that there is no evidence in the Nirukta that its author was acquainted with script and 
writing. 
5 This does not necessarily exclude the meaning "eternal", for which Brough (1952: 76) proposed the alternative 
"being located in", hence "constantly associated with". The interpretation here offered leaves place for both these 
meanings. 
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this other form? According to Audumbaråyaˆa, speech resides in indriya (1). 
Simonsson observes quite rightly that we shall probably never know what exactly 
Audumbaråyaˆa meant by his aphorism (p. 26), mainly because we do not know what 
he meant by indriya. Is perhaps the mind (manas) intended, which is, according to 
Bhagavadg¥tå 10.22 (cp. 13.5), the indriya par excellence?6 Biardeau considers it very 
likely that indriya here means "l'organe de la parole". The concluding line of our 
passage, which for all we know represents Yåska's [200] position, does not present this 
problem of interpretation. It allows of the interpretation according to which the Vedic 
mantra resides in human knowledge. 
 The above reflections lead to the following translation (which follows Simons-
son's as far as possible): 
(1) According to Audumbaråyaˆa, speech resides constantly in indriya. 
(2) In this [context the following objection has been raised:] The fourfold 
classification of words does not hold good, nor the reciprocal reference of sounds (or 
physical manifestations of words, sentences) which are not produced simultaneously, 
nor the relationship postulated by grammar. 
(3) [Reply:] But because sound is pervasive and utterly small, naming, which serves 
the purpose of worldly intercourse, [has been done] with the help of sound.7 
(4) They (i.e., sounds)8 designate gods in the same manner as they designate human 
beings.9 
(5) The mantra in the Veda accomplishes the ritual,10 because it is constantly 
present in human knowledge.11 
[201] 
 It is not impossible, but not sure either, that Audumbaråyaˆa's opinion expressed 
in (1) coincides with the one expressed in (5).12 It would seem, moreover, that (2) - (5) 
constitute a unit: (2) raises an objection based on the assumption that speech = sound; 
                                                
6 Kahrs suggests the faculties våc, pråˆa, cak∑us, ßrotra, and manas, which are often referred to in the Upani∑ads; e.g. 
B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad 1.3.2 ff.; Chåndogya Upani∑ad 1.2.3 ff.; 2.11.1; 5.1.1-5; Kena Upani∑ad 1.1-2. 
7 In this interpretation the double use of ßabda in (3) is essential, and does not show, as Simonsson (1961: 27 n. 1) 
thought, that the expression vyåptimattvåt tu ßabdasyåˆ¥yastvåc ca may have been an old formula which was taken 
over without change. Kahrs refers me in this connection to Smith, 1953: 138, where this "formula" is mentioned. 
8 Simonsson (1961: 25) objects to the equation of te∑åm with *ßabdånåm, pointing out that (3) contains no plural of 
ßabda, to which te∑åm could refer. To this the answer must be (i) that (2) contains a plural of ßabda (ßabdånåm), and 
(ii) that Yåska sometimes uses singulars and plurals in a somewhat erratic way; in Nir. 1.1, for example, nåmåkhyåte 
and nåmåkhyåtayor (dual) are immediately followed by bhåvapradhånam åkhyåtam (sing.) and sattvapradhånåni 
nåmåni (plural!). 
9 This may of course mean that Vedic words are used as among human beings. This would agree with Yåska's own 
observation to the extent that Vedic words may be linked to ‘worldly’ roots and vice versa; see Nir. 2.2: athåpi 
bhå∑ikebhyo dhåtubhyo naigamå˙ k®to bhå∑yante/ .../ athåpi naigamebhyo bhå∑ikå˙/ ... 
10  I.e., with Simonsson, the mantra is for the accomplishment of ritual (bahuvr¥hi), or it is the accomplishment of 
ritual (tatpuru∑a) (Strauss, 1927: 113; Brough, 1952: 77). 
11  Contrary to Simonsson, I assume suppletion of genetive *mantrasya, rather than of *ßabdasya. 
12  According to Simonsson (1961: 29), (1) implies for Yåska limitation to the individual, whereas (5) implies that 
sound transcends individuals and generations. 
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(3) responds, by first explaining why there are sounds at all in connection with speech; 
(4) elaborates, stressing the wide realm of use of sound; (5), finally, undermines the 
objection by pointing out that, at least in the case of Vedic mantras (which interest 
Yåska in the first place), speech is not just sound. Audumbaråyaˆa's opinion expressed 
in (1) seems to do no more than introduce the discussion: (2) cannot really be read as a 
reaction to (1), for the objection embodied in (2) looses all its force once position (1) is 
accepted. 
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